Criminal Procedure—Search and Seizure—Electronic Eavesdropping—Abortion: Recording of Voluntary Conversation Between Police Agent and Defendant Admissible in Evidence.—State v. Wright, 74 Wn. 2d 355, 444 P.2d 867 (1968) by anon,
Washington Law Review 
Volume 45 Number 2 
4-1-1970 
Criminal Procedure—Search and Seizure—Electronic 
Eavesdropping—Abortion: Recording of Voluntary Conversation 
Between Police Agent and Defendant Admissible in 
Evidence.—State v. Wright, 74 Wn. 2d 355, 444 P.2d 867 (1968) 
anon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
anon, Recent Developments, Criminal Procedure—Search and Seizure—Electronic 
Eavesdropping—Abortion: Recording of Voluntary Conversation Between Police Agent and Defendant 
Admissible in Evidence.—State v. Wright, 74 Wn. 2d 355, 444 P.2d 867 (1968), 45 Wash. L. Rev. 411 
(1970). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol45/iss2/9 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
CnmnNAL fPOCEDUE-SEARmC AND S m-uR-ELEcTO ,tc EAVES-
DROPPiNG-ABoRTION: RECORDING OF VOLUNTARY CONVERSATION
BnEw N POLICE AGENT AND DEF-NDANT ADnssiBLE IN EvIDENCE.-
State v. Wright, 74 Wn. 2d 355, 444 P.2d 867 (1968).
Informed that defendant had committed an abortion in his home,
the police hired a female agent who made arrangements with the de-
fendant by telephonic conversations, which were monitored and
recorded. The agent, equipped with a hidden transmitter, kept her
appointment and transmitted defendant's explanation of the abortion
to the police, who again monitored and recorded the conversation. That
evening she returned to defendant's home and paid the fee, and, as
defendant prepared her for the operation, sent the conversation to
monitoring police, who recorded it. All monitoring was done without
prior court order. Just before the operation was to occur, the agent
alerted the police, who then entered, seized the defendant's medical
instruments, and arrested him. At trial, defendant was convicted of
abortion and unlawful medical practice. On appeal to the Washington
Supreme Court, Held: Recordings of the conversations, monitored in
defendant's home, were properly admitted into evidence1 since, under
existing United States Supreme Court decisions, there was no "search
and seizure" of the conversations, and thus, even though the monitor-
ing was undertaken without a warrant, there was no violation of de-
fendant's rights under the fourth amendment.2 State v. Wright, 74 Wn.
2d 355, 444 P.2d 867 (1968).
The United States Supreme Court had faced a similar situation in
On Lee v. United States.' There Chin Poy, an old acquaintance of the
defendant, had concealed a transmitter on his person, entered defen-
dant's laundry, and engaged him in conversation during which the
defendant made incriminating statements, which in turn were trans-
mitted to a narcotics agent outside. At trial, Chin Poy did not testify,
1. If the evidence bad been obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, it would
be inadmissible in the state courts. Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV,
3. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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but the content of the monitored conversation was revealed in testi-
mony given by the agent. Defendant contended that this evidence was
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment because the eavesdrop
had been made without a judicial order, and thus was inadmissible in
federal courts.' The Court ruled that since neither Chin Poy nor the
narcotics agent was a trespasser, the evidence was legally obtained;
this was no different, reasoned the Court, from a witness using field
glasses to magnify his vision of a "private" indiscretion. 5 Justice
Burton, dissenting, denied that there was no trespass, arguing that
the presence of the transmitter was the presence of the agent's ear and
that the words were seized without warrant or consent. 6 Justices Frank-
furter and Douglas, also dissenting, condemned such "dirty business"
as a violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.7
The same question concerned the Supreme Court in Lopez v. United
States,8 in which an Internal Revenue agent, without a search warrant,
recorded a conversation in defendant's office, during which defendant
made a bribe offer. The Court reasoned that the agent's feigned willing-
ness to accept the bribe did not make his entry an illegal one. This
was not even "eavesdropping," since the9
Government did not use an electronic device to listen in on con-
versations it could not otherwise have heard. Instead, the device
was used only to obtain the most reliable evidence possible....
The Court then proposed an assumption of risk test: that is, when
defendant made the bribe offer he took the risk that his statements
would be used against him in court, whether by memory or recording.'
Chief Justice Warren, concurring, distinguished Lopez from On Lee
(of which he disapproved): whereas the agent in Lopez was a known
IRS agent, the informer in On Lee was an old friend;" moreover, the
monitored conversation in On Lee was placed in evidence without the
4. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. 343 U.S. at 754.
6. Id. at 765-67.
7. Id. at 761.
8. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
9. Id. at 439.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 441-43. Under an assumption of risk analysis, the assumption by defendant
is obviously clearer when he attempts to bribe a government agent than when speaking to
a friend.
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informer having been put on the stand. Justices Brennan, Douglas and
Goldberg dissented on the grounds that such a recording violated an
affirmative right to privacy guaranteed by the fourth amendment.' 2
The Lopez assumption of risk test, however, has been somewhat
eroded by later Supreme Court decisions. In Osborn v. United States, 3
a federal agent had recorded a conversation with the defendant, an
attorney, in which the defendant asked the agent to attempt to bribe
a prospective juror at the trial of his client, The recording was used at
trial to corroborate the agent's testimony. The Court concluded that
since the use of the recording device under the particular and precise
circumstances had been authorized by a prior court order, it need not
rest its decision "upon the broad foundation" of its opinion in Lopez
because "it is evident that the circumstances ... fall within the nar-
rower compass of the Lopez concurring and dissenting opinions." 4
The conviction was affirmed based upon "the procedure of antecedent
justification before a magistrate that is central to the fourth amend-
ment."'15 However, Justice Douglas dissented, reasoning that any elec-
tronic surveillance violated the fourth amendment right to privacy.' 6
In Berger v. New York,' the Supreme Court overturned New
York's permissive eavesdrop statute because it failed to require a
highly specific and particularized judicial order to authorize eaves-
dropping. The opinion seems to approve of Osborn only because such
stringent requirements were met in granting the warrant. 8
The shift in the Supreme Court's fourth amendment analysis from
12. Id. at 469-71.
13, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
14. Id. at 327.
15. Id. at 330.
16. 385 U.S. at 405-13. Douglas related this right to privacy with the right he noted
speaking for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which held that
the specific guarantees of the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments have
penumbras guaranteeing a positive right to privacy. Griswold throws a shadow of doubt
on On Lee and Lopez, although the holding was restricted explicitly to the marital rela
tionship, for there searching the marital bedroom for evidence of a minor crime was
unreasonable per se, with or without a warrant. See Griswold, supra at 485.
But the proclamation of such a broad constitutional "right of privacy" is both con-
fusing and misleading. The fourth amendment prohibition does invest the individual with
specific rights, and as such safeguards a positive right to privacy; but the nature of this
right in a search and seizure situation needs to be precisely defined. Reliance on a general
right to privacy based upon several amendments only clouds the issue. Note, From Private
Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 968, 980 (1968); accord, Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
17. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
18. Id. at 57.
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property concepts to a balance between personal privacy and the neces-
sities of effective police procedure 9 crystallized in Katz v. United
States.0 In this case, the Court overturned the conviction because
evidence against the defendant had been obtained by attaching a listen-
ing device to the exterior of the public phone booth from which defen-
dant transmitted wagering information across state lines. The Court
ruled that such evidence was obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment because prior judicial authorization had not been procured.2'
The Fourth Amendment protects people not places. What a per-
son knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .... But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public may be constitutionally protected...
if he has justifiably relied on that privacy. In sum, the fourth amend-
ment is violated by a governmental invasion of an individual's privacy
whenever the individual expects to be free from such intrusions and
justifiably relies on this expectation of privacy.2
The effect of Katz, Berger, and Osborn on On Lee and Lopez is
unclear. The propriety of the Washington Supreme Court's ruling in
Wright depends upon the continued validity of On Lee and Lopez.2
While none of the later cases expressly overruled either On Lee or
Lopez, some writers have suggested that they have done so "sub silen-
tio". 12 On the other hand, Justice White, concurring in Katz, reasoned
that On Lee and Lopez were undisturbed by the decision 25 since the
assumption of risk test of Lopez was equivalent to the reasonable ex-
pectancy formulation of Katz. He thought a reasonable man would
assume the risk inherent in speaking with another that the latter might
19. Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping, 68 CoLum.
L. REv. 189, 196 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Greenawalt]. Previously emphasis had been
on constitutionally protected physical areas. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928).
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
21. Id. at 351-52.
22. Id. at 353.
23. The Washington Supreme Court itself recognized indirectly that its ruling was
dependent on the "continued viability" of these two cases. State v. Wright, 74 Wn. 2d 355,
359, 444 P.2d 676, 678 (1968).
24. See Dash, Katz-Variations on a Theme by Berger, 18 CATHOLIC U.L. RPv. 296,
311 (1968); Pitler, Eavesdropping and Wiretapping-The Aftermath of Katz and Kaiser:
A Comment, 34 BROoxLY'N L. REv. 223, 224 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Pitler].
25. 389 U.S. at 363 n.**. It can be inferred that Harlan's opinion is in agreement.
See Pitler, supra, note 24, at 226.
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memorize what he hears for later repetition or, similarly, that he might
be recording the conversation. 26
If Katz did not overrule Lopez and On Lee, Osborn may have. In
basing its opinion on a narrower ground than Lopez, the Court left in
doubt the status of non-trespassary eavesdropping done without a
warrant. At least, the holding may indicate a disposition of the Court
to overrule Lopez 27
Under the combined force of Katz, Berger, and Osborn it appears
that the United States Supreme Court is straying somewhat from its
position in the earlier cases, but, at least in the opinion of the Wash-
ington Supreme Court, not to the extent of overruling Lopez and On
Lee. The Washington Court in Wright rejected defendant's contention
that Katz was dispositive of the issue, relying on Justice White's con-
curring opinion and distinguishing Katz on its dissimilar fact pattern.
It is true that the facts in the Katz case were not so similar as to
absolutely compel a reversal in Wright. 2 In Katz the surveillance was
done without the knowledge of any of the participants; in Wright it
was done with one party's consent and had only the evidenciary func-
tion of preserving the consenting party's recollection. -9 Yet the em-
phasis in Katz on a right to be free of warrantless police searches
obscures somewhat the distinction between consensual and third-party
eavesdropping, and thus may render the factual differences between
26. It is not clear that a reasonable man would necessarily assume the risk of eaves-
dropping by a third party when speaking to a friend as in On Lee, but not when
talking to an associate in a public phone booth as in Katz, except to the extent he relies
on the fact that legal protections are less stringent in the former situation. Perhaps the
proper question is this: what risks of eavesdropping ought the criminal system impose on
individuals. Note, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HAsv. L. Itav. 69, 193-94 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court, 1966 Term].
While a man could reasonably expect that no one was secretly listening in on his
conversation, whether speaking face-to-face with his friend or on the telephone, could
he also reasonably expect a listener to keep his words in complete confidence and never
testify against him at trial? It is settled that the fourth amendment does not protect
against a mistaken belief that a person in whom one confides will not reveal such informa-
tion. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206
(1966). But see United States v. Jones, 292 F. Supp. 1001 (D.D.C. 1968). Nor is it a
violation of the fourth amendment for police to obtain evidence by listening in on an
extension line with the permission of the party at their end. Rathbun v. United States,
355 U.S. 107 (1957).
27. The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, supra note 26, at 186. But see Greenawalt,
supra note 19, at 202.
28. See Dancy v. United States, 390 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1968).
29. See United States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550 (2d. Cir.), cert. granted and aff'd per
curiam, 394 U.. 450 (1969) (the memorandum opinion was not decided on the con-
stitutional question).
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the cases legally insignificant. 0 It can be argued that in both cases the
right of privacy had been violated, since the respective defendants did
not consent to the overhearing of their statements and the statements
were overheard by uninvited third parties.8 '
Such an interpretation of Katz was urged on the Washington court
by the defendant in Wright on the authority of United States v.
White.32 In White, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the fourth amend-
ment, as interpreted by Katz, protected an affirmative right to privacy
which could not be invaded by electronic surveillance of any sort,
unless either a warrant was obtained or the right was waived by the
speaker.33 The Washington court distinguished White on a factual
circumstance, 4 but fuirther reasoned that in any event the defendant
had waived the right to privacy referred to in White. The waiver found
was not expressed, but was implied from the conclusion that he could
not reasonably expect that his statement might not be repeated in
court. 5 Apparently the Washington court decided, as did the Second
Circuit in United States v. Kaufer,6 that the distinction between sur-
veillance done without either party's knowledge and that done with
one party's consent is still valid, and that Katz applies only to the
former. Further, while White holds only that On Lee no longer con-
trols, the ruling in Wright can clearly be supported by the authority
of Lopez alone.37
The Washington court's interpretation of Katz and Osborn as not
overruling On Lee or Lopez seems correct. Thus, in Wright the re-
30. See United States v. Jones, 292 F. Supp. 1001, 1008 (D.D.C. 1968).
31. See United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 394 U.S. 957(1969); accord, United States v. Doty, 416 F.2d 887 (10th. Cir. 1968).
32. 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 394 U.S. 957 (1969).
33. 405 F.2d at 845. The court conceded that On Lee would control in a consensual
eavesdrop situation had it not been eroded by subsequent cases.
34. 74 Wn. 2d at 359 n.2, 444 P.2d at 678 n.2. The factual circumstance was that the
agent in White did not testify, but did so in Wright.
35. White differs as to whether this right to privacy can be waived by one's actions.
405 F.2d at 845.
36. United States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550 (2d Cir.), cert. granted and aff'd per
curiam, 394 U.S. 450 (1969).
37. Of those Justices who participated in the decision of both On Lee and Lopez, only
one, Chief Justice Warren, detected any difference between the two cases, and this was on
the fact that the agent did not testify in On Lee, which was not the situation in Wright.
But cf. Dancy v. United States, 390 F.2d 370, 372 (5th Cir. 1968) (Fahy, J. dissenting),
in which it is argued that there is a significant legal difference between carrying the
recorder as in Lopez and carrying a transmitter as in On Lee.
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corded evidence was properly held admissible.38 Wright was a case of
misplaced confidence, not of search and seizure; the recorded con-
versation could therefore stand in the stead of the informant's own
testimony and the fact that the evidence was obtained without prior
judicial authorization does not make it violative of the fourth amend-
ment3 9
If the constitutional problems presented by eavesdropping are an-
alyzed by balancing personal liberty and the exigencies of efficient
criminal law enforcement (apparently the Katz approach),4 the Wash-
ington court's opinion is on firm ground. All governmental actions,
especially police practices, should afford respect to the dignity and
integrity of each citizen,41 and the fourth amendment protects the
sanctity of the privacy of the individual-but it does not shield him
from all governmental intrusions. It is certainly an annoyance and a
humiliation for a defendant to be confronted with a recording of a
supposedly private conversation, taped by the other party to the con-
versation; 42 however, in a consensual eavesdropping case, defendant's
humiliation arises not so much from the existence of a recording as it
does from a realization that he has misjudged the character of his
confidant, who has betrayed him.4 3 It is also an indignity for a defen-
dant when at trial a friend testifies from memory on the content of
their private conversations; but the fourth amendment protects an
individual's privacy and dignity only insofar as it prohibits unreason-
able searches and seizures. What one openly exposes to the public is
38. Congressional interpretation of the fourth amendment protection in this area
supports the Washington court's ruling. Title III § 2511(2)(c) of the Omnibus Crime
Bill of 1968 (Pub. L. 90-351) states that interception of an oral communication by a law
officer in a consensual eavesdrop situation without a warrant is not unlawful. This law
was passed after the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Katz and thus can be
viewed as a congressional interpretation of that decision. It was enacted after Wright
was decided and is not retroactive (§ 2520 Sec. 804(k)) but it does purport to supersede
state law prospectively (§ 2511(1)(b)(v)).
39. Holt v. United States, 404 F.2d 914, 919 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086
(1968); United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 850, cert. granted 394 U.S. 957 (1969)
(Castle, J. dissenting) ; stating that an informer's testimony is admissible. See cases cited
in note 26 supra.
40. Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 196.
41. Miranda v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
42. The indignity is not on the order of a frisk made by police without a warrant, as
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). There the court found the search to be a severe
intrusion on personal dignity, but held it reasonable since the officer had a reasonable
suspicion that the frisked person was carrying a dangerous weapon.
43. See Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 197.
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not subject to protection;4 4 similarly, what one reveals to a single
person is not protected with respect to that person.45
The Fourth Amendment [does not protect] a wrongdoer's mis-
placed belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his
wrongdoing will not reveal it.
Since a participant in a conversation may repeat at trial what he
has heard, why should it not be permissible, even highly desirable, to
have an accurate record of this conversation to support or rebut the
witness's testimony, and why should there be any restrictions placed
on this evidence beyond that placed on the testimony? The individual's
sanctity must be weighed against the demands of the public interest
to determine the scope of the protection afforded the individual under
the fourth amendment. 6 The reliability of evidence submitted at trial
is one of the most compelling public interests within the criminal
process. All methods which enhance the trustworthiness of trials ought
to be promoted as being in the best interests of both the defendant (at
least, if he is innocent) and the people of the state.
One would think that where the informer is, according to appellant's
description, "of dubious reputation ' 47 the defendant would welcome
at trial an independent record of their conversation. In fact, in any
situation where the agent's testimony may be impeachable, it is highly
undesirable that the defendant's fate should hinge on the outcome of a
testimonial battle between the two people who know the truth-one
the informer, the other the defendant, perhaps a person of previous
good repute. 48 The contention of the defendant in Wright was that a
prior judicial order was necessary before an eavesdrop could be made;
but there is no reason why consensual eavesdropping should ever be
disallowed.49
In its attempt to achieve reliability of evidence the court must not
44. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
45. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
46. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-537 (1967).
47. Brief for Appellant at 2, State v. Wright, 74 Wn. 2d 335, 444 P.2d 676.
48. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 330 (1966).
49. If the procedure of requiring prior authorization by a magistrate is to have any
significance, it must be assumed that in some instances such requests will be denied.
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tread upon the individual's rights.50 But when evidence from a con-
sensual eavesdrop is sought to be introduced, objections from a defen-
dant in Wright's position must in effect lay claim to5
a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the agent's
memory, or to challenge the agent's credibility without being
beset by corroborating evidence that is not susceptible of im-
peachment. For no other argument can justify excluding an ac-
curate version of a conversation that the agent could testify to
from memory.
Only where the recorded eavesdrop is sought to be introduced as a
replacement for the testimony of the agent does a problem arise.5" At
any trial where, as in Wright, the informer is allowed to testify,53 the
evidentiary products of consensual eavesdropping should be held to
be admissible.
50. But considering the magnitude of the state's interest in obtaining reliable evidence,
only the invasion of a specific Constitutional or statutory right should override this
interest and cause the evidence to be declared inadmissible. Lopez v. United States, 373
U.s. 427, 440 (1963).
Ethical considerations about the deception involved should not be given any weight.
The breach of confidence in Wright was not substantially different from others that the
law fails to recognize. The police practice in Wright was no more objectionable than if
the agent had merely elicited the information and then testified himself. See Greenawalt,
supra note 19, at 193, 214-27.
51. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963).
52. Id. at 443-44 (Warren, C.J., concurring). As mentioned in note 34 supra, the
informer in Wright did in fact testify.
53. Cf. cases cited in note 26 supra.
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